University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Master's Theses

University of Connecticut Graduate School

12-18-2010

The Heart and Mind at Work: The Effects of
Implicit and Explicit Reasoning on Performance
Appraisal
Scott Ryan
University of Connecticut - Storrs, scott.ryan@uconn.edu

Recommended Citation
Ryan, Scott, "The Heart and Mind at Work: The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Reasoning on Performance Appraisal" (2010). Master's
Theses. 25.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/25

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Connecticut Graduate School at OpenCommons@UConn. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenCommons@UConn. For more information, please contact
opencommons@uconn.edu.

The Heart and Mind at Work: The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Reasoning on
Performance Appraisal

Scott Ryan
M.S., Brown University, 1999

A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
at the
University of Connecticut
2010

ii
APPROVAL PAGE

Master of Arts Thesis

The Heart and Mind at Work: The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Reasoning on
Performance Appraisal

Presented by
Scott Ryan

Major Advisor
___________________________________________________________
R. James Holzworth

Associate Advisor
________________________________________________________
Janet L. Barnes-Farrell

Associate Advisor
________________________________________________________
Lucy Gilson

University of Connecticut
2010

iii
Acknowledgments
I would to thank Jim Holzworth for all of his help and patience over the past two
years. It is greatly appreciated. Janet Barnes-Farrell has been extremely helpful at
every stage of my time here at the University of Connecticut. I appreciate Lucy
Gilson agreeing to be on my committee. I would also like to that my research
assistant, Scott Emch for helping with data collection, and Megan Dove-Steinkamp
for helpful suggestions throughout the process.

iv
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................... 5
Method ........................................................................................................................ 20
Results......................................................................................................................... 25
Discussion ................................................................................................................... 31
References................................................................................................................... 40

5
The Heart and Mind at Work: The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Reasoning on
Performance Appraisal
Since Landy and Farr’s (1980) watershed review and evaluation of the
performance appraisal literature, research on performance appraisal has been
redirected toward investigation of the cognitive processes involved (Ilgen, BarnesFarrell, & McKellin, 1993). Barnes-Farrell (2001) notes that there are a number of
important cognitive processes involved in performance appraisal. Because
individuals cannot explicitly process every piece of information about a subordinate,
they must employ some cognitive simplification strategies. These simplification
strategies are associated with implicit reasoning (Hogarth, 2001) and, according to
Payne and Gawronski (2010), evidence is emerging that a great deal of social
information processing is implicit. Barnes-Farrell (2001) discusses how implicit
reasoning can increase accuracy in performance appraisal. Specifically, appraisers
often face information overload; when facing information overload, implicit
processes can be more accurate than explicit processes (Hogarth, 2005). McMackin
and Slovic (2000) and Wilson and Schooler (1991) explored different task conditions
under which implicit and explicit reasoning are superior in different cognitive tasks.
The purpose of the present study is to further investigate implicit and explicit
reasoning in the context of performance appraisal, under conditions of low and high
cognitive load.
The current study investigates the merits of explicit and implicit reasoning
processes in performance appraisal judgments. Explicit processes are explicit in the
sense that one is aware of the details of the process (MacDonald, 2008; Hogarth,
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2001). Implicit processes are implicit in the sense that one is not aware of the details
of the process. Explicit processes are often associated with controlled and conscious
processes, whereas implicit processes are associated with automatic and unconscious
processes (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).
Explicit processes are associated with analysis whereas implicit processes are
associated with intuition (Hammond, 1996, Hogarth, 2001). Hammond’s (1996)
cognitive continuum theory explains the relationship between analysis and intuition.
Analysis is described as being slow, high in cognitive control, and high in conscious
awareness, whereas intuition is described as being fast, low in cognitive control, and
low in conscious awareness. As the name implies, cognitive continuum theory does
not consider a process to be completely analytical or completely intuitive. Analysis
and intuition are opposite ends of a continuum. A process can be partly analytical
and partly intuitive. The current study examines explicit and implicit processes in
performance appraisal judgments. As suggested by cognitive continuum theory, a
performance appraisal judgment may be partly explicit and partly implicit.
Individuals making performance appraisal judgments may use a combination of
explicit and implicit processes. Supervisors who are making performance appraisal
judgments may explicitly weigh specific aspects of an employee’s performance, or
simply rely on their intuitive impression of how well the employee is performing.
The current study compares the accuracy of these two approaches.
The accuracy of implicit cognitive processes
A great deal of research has investigated the merits of quick, intuitive, implicit
judgments (e.g., Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; McMackin & Slovic,
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2000; Hogarth, 2001; Sloman, 1996). One demonstration of the accuracy of implicit
cognitive processes was performed by Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio
(1997). Participants played a game in which they chose cards from different decks.
Each card could result in a positive or negative payout. The goal was to find the deck
that had the most positive payouts. Participants began showing implicit awareness
before they were explicitly aware that the decks were positive. The evidence for this
implicit awareness was that participants displayed an increased galvanic skin
response before choosing a card from the deck with negative payouts. The skin
conductance response indicated an increase in sweat, which was assumed to be
associated with negative affect. This negative affect response was interpreted as
evidence that participants “knew” that the decks were negative. However, when
asked whether they knew which deck was more positive, they responded that they did
not. These results indicated that the participants behaved as if they knew which decks
were advantageous even though this “knowledge” was not explicit. This is one
example in which an implicit cognitive process is more accurate than an explicit
cognitive process, assuming that accuracy is defined as the speed with which one can
uncover a pattern.
Under certain conditions, explicitly considering specific reasons for a
judgment can lead to inaccuracy. Wilson and Schooler (1991) performed a
manipulation in which individuals were asked to write out reasons for their judgments
before making the judgments. In the current paper this is referred to as the
justification manipulation. This manipulation leads individuals to take a process that
is implicit and make the process more explicit. Participants made judgments of the

8
quality of strawberry jams. Some participants wrote down justifications before
making the ratings while others did not. Judgment accuracy was defined as matching
the ratings given by experts published in a popular consumer magazine. Those who
wrote down their justifications did not match the ratings of experts as accurately as
those who did not write down their justifications. Accuracy of judgment was reduced
by making reasons for the judgment explicit.
McMackin and Slovic (2000) performed a study using the justification
manipulation, in which one is asked to provide reasons for a judgment before making
the judgment. They had a group of students rate specific print advertisements on
likeability. Other participants were then asked to estimate how each advertisement
scored in the survey of students. Accuracy was defined as the extent to which
participants’ ratings matched ratings from other students at their university. In one
condition the participants were told to write down the factors that were likely to
influence students’ ratings of the ads before they provided judgments. In a control
condition participants were simply told to provide ratings. Results indicated that
participants who wrote down their reasons were less accurate than participants who
did not write down their reasons. This is further evidence that making a process
explicit can decrease accuracy.
Why would writing down reasons for a judgment make the judgment less
accurate? Wilson and Schooler (1991) suggest that participants in the control
condition of their study evaluated the stimuli “fairly optimally” (p. 191). If an
individuals’ initial implicit reaction is accurate, asking someone to make that reaction
explicit can only make the judgment less (or equally) accurate. Accuracy is so high
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that it cannot increase, it can only decrease or remain the same. Wilson and Schooler
(1991) suggest that justification can change an individuals’ natural reaction and “To
the extent that their initial reaction was adaptive and functional, this change might be
in a less optimal direction” (p. 182). Wilson and Schooler (1991) also suggest that
individuals often do not understand the true reasons for their attitudes. When they
write out their reasons, these reasons may simply represent what is accessible at the
time, rather than reflecting true reasons for their belief. When considering their
reasons, these reasons may conflict with their implicit appraisal of an object, and this
causes them to make a different rating than if they had not written out their reasons.
The accuracy of explicit cognitive processes
It may seem unlikely that focusing on reasons for a judgment can decrease
judgment accuracy. Both research and common sense tell us that careful, explicit
judgments have great advantages over implicit judgments (Janis & Mann, 1977).
However, the claim being made in the current study is not that implicit judgments are
always superior to explicit judgments. Implicit judgments will be superior to explicit
judgments in specific circumstances (Hogarth, 2005). Perhaps the most important
condition is whether a process can be specified by rules (Hammond et al, 1987;
Hogarth, 2001). These rules could be logical rules or mathematical formulas. This
may be why reasoning about physics is a common example of when intuition leads us
astray. Basic motion of objects is well specified by precise rules and mathematical
formulas, so using intuition rather than analytical formulas is likely to lead to error.
Another condition under which explicit judgments are more accurate than implicit
judgment is when there is a limited amount of information (Hogarth, 2005). Hogarth
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(2005) states that under low analytical complexity, explicit reasoning is more accurate
than implicit reasoning.
The McMackin and Slovic study (2000) described earlier found that when
rating the likeability of print advertisements, implicit judgments were more accurate
than explicit judgments. However, the authors did not claim that thinking about a
judgment always leads to errors. The advertising task was chosen because it was
thought to be a task that would benefit from implicit reasoning, based on criteria
specified in cognitive continuum theory (Hammond, 1996). In contrast, certain
judgments may be made more accurately if explicit thought is put into them.
McMackin and Slovic (2000) tested the hypothesis that explicit judgments are
sometimes more accurate than implicit judgments. They asked participants to make
judgments about numerical quantities, such as the area of the United States. Like the
advertising study, participants in this sample were split into a control group and a
justification group. In the justification group participants wrote down their reasons
for judgments of numerical quantities before making those judgments. Participants
who gave reasons for their judgments were more accurate than people who did not
give reasons. These results indicate that explicit reasoning can outperform implicit
reasoning when performing tasks that favor explicit reasoning (Hammond et. al,
1987; Hogarth, 2001). Under some conditions, providing justification before a
judgment can have a favorable effect on the quality of the judgment.
Performance appraisal
A number of performance appraisal studies have investigated processes that
involve implicit and explicit reasoning, such as the effect of keeping a diary on
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performance appraisal (Bernardin & Walter, 1987; DeNisi, Robbins, & Cafferty,
1989; Varma, DeNisi & Peters, 1996). Writing things in a diary is similar to writing
out reasons for a judgment; it makes cognitive processes explicit. DeNisi, Robbins
and Cafferty (1989) performed a study in which participants either did or did not keep
a diary. Participants watched videotapes of carpenters performing their work, and
then rated the quality of the work using a Likert scale. The dependent variable in the
study was accuracy of the participant’s overall ratings of performance. Accuracy was
defined as how well the participants’ ratings matched the level of performance
displayed in the video segments. The performances of the carpenters were
deliberately designed to display three levels of performance: low, medium, and high
(and testing showed that the videos did display low, medium, and high performance).
Results indicated that participants in the diary condition were the more accurate than
participants in the no diary condition. Participants in the diary conditions were able
to distinguish between high, moderate, and low performance, but participants in the
no diary condition were not able to distinguish between these performance levels.
The evidence from this study indicated that writing down information before making
ratings leads to greater accuracy.
Varma, DeNisi, and Peters (1996) studied the relationship between diary
keeping and affect. Participants were supervisors working in a large multi-national
electronics firm. Participants either did or did not keep a diary. Affect was
conceptualized in a similar way to likeability, with measures such as “I would like to
spend more time with this person.” Contrary to the researchers’ predictions, the
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relationship between affect and ratings was lowest in the no diary condition. The
researchers expected the relationship to be highest in the no diary condition.
Performance appraisal systems often require supervisors to both rate
performance and give justification(s) for their ratings (Brutus, 2010). For example, a
supervisor may give an employee a rating on a 1 to 5 scale indicating the quality of
the employee’s work, and this numerical rating may also be delivered with a narrative
explaining the strengths and weaknesses of the employee’s performance. When
looking at a rating and written justification, subordinates may assume that the rating
is based on the reasons given in writing. They may assume that their supervisor
carefully considered all aspects of their performance, and wrote down all of these
reasons; then, after carefully considering all aspects of performance, the supervisor
made the numerical rating. However, there is another possibility. Rather than the
written narrative influencing the rating, it is also possible that the numerical rating
influenced the written narrative. Supervisors are likely to have been watching
employees throughout the evaluation period. Over that time, it is likely that they
formed judgments of their employees’ performance. When it comes time to review
the employees’ performance, they may already know what numerical ratings they will
assign. Therefore, they might first write down a numerical rating, and then develop
written justification based on their rating. It is possible that supervisors’ numerical
ratings conform to the written data they have provided, but it is also possible that they
selectively present written justifications that conform to the ratings they have
assigned. Results from Wilson and Schooler (1991) and McMackin and Slovic
(2000) indicate that writing down reasons before (as opposed to after) making a
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judgment can affect the accuracy of the judgment. It is important to understand any
effect that order (written narrative first vs. numerical rating first) has on the
performance appraisal process.
Memory-based and online judgments
Other performance appraisal studies that have investigated the
implicit/explicit distinction have involved the relationship between memory and
judgment (DeNisi & Peters, 1996; Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996; Woehr & Feldman,
1993). These studies are similar to the explicit justification studies (McMackin &
Slovic, 2000; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) because people write down recalled
behaviors before making ratings. Many of these studies are based on the distinction
between memory-based and online judgments (Hastie & Park, 1986). Online
judgments occur when individuals are asked to form judgments before they observe a
person. These judgments are made “online” in the sense that individuals are forming
judgments while they are making their observations. Memory-based judgments occur
when someone is asked to make a judgment only after observing a person. These
judgments are memory-based because one must rely on memory when making the
judgment. For example, someone may listen to a conversation and then later be asked
to make an unexpected judgment, such as an individual’s age. Because one did not
expect to make the judgment, one must essentially recreate the conversation based on
memory, and then make the judgment. The judgment will be based on whatever cues
the individual can remember. If one were told before listening to the conversation
that one would be guessing an individual’s age, one would make the judgment while
listening to the conversation, and would not need to rely on memory. This is deemed
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to be an online judgment. Hastie and Park (1986) showed that when individuals
made memory-based judgments, there was a significant correlation between the
favorability of recalled behaviors and the favorability of judgments, because the
judgment was based on the recalled behaviors. When an online judgment was made,
the correlation between the favorability of recalled behaviors and the favorability of
judgment was not significant.
When executing a performance appraisal study, it is important to consider
whether participants will be making online or memory based judgments, because
participants may make different judgments depending on whether the judgments are
made online or are memory-based (Woehr & Feldman, 1993). Based on the work of
Hastie and Park (1986), Woehr and Feldman (1993) investigated the relationship
between performance appraisal judgments and memory. Participants rated the
effectiveness of an economics professor delivering a lecture based on a videotape of
performance. The memory task involved writing out all of the behaviors that
participants could recall from watching the videos. A ratio was calculated between
the number of positive behaviors recalled and the number of negative behaviors
recalled. This allowed for a correlation to be computed between ratings and memory:
The positivity of the rating was compared to the positivity of the memories. The
order of the ratings task and memory task was manipulated. One group made the
rating first and then performed the memory task, and one group performed the
memory task and then made the rating. In the “memory task first” condition,
participants wrote about behaviors relevant to the judgment they were about to make,
and then made the judgment. This is similar to the justification manipulation used in
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the McMackin and Slovic (2000) and Wilson and Schooler (1991) studies, in which
individuals write out reasons for a judgment before making the judgment. In the
“rating task first” condition of Woehr and Feldman (1993), participants first made
judgments, and later tried to recall behaviors displayed in the videos. Because the
memory task came after the rating, it could not have influenced the rating. This is
similar to the control groups from the McMackin and Slovic (2000) and Wilson and
Schooler (1991) studies. In the control groups of these studies, participants did not
write out justifications before making ratings.
In the memory-based judgment condition of Woehr and Feldman (1993),
participants were told to learn as much of the lecture material as possible. In the
online judgment condition, participants were told to focus on the professor’s
performance. The results from Woehr and Feldman (1993) are displayed in Table 1.
Within the memory-based judgment condition, the order of the tasks did not affect the
correlation between memory and rating. In both the “rating task first” and “memory
task first” conditions, there was a significant positive correlation between memory
and the performance appraisal rating. This correlation was positive because
individuals who remembered more positive behaviors made more positive ratings.
The memory-rating vs. rating-memory order did not affect the correlation between
memory and rating because the same basic process was used to make the performance
ratings, whether the memory task was performed first or the rating task was
performed first. Within the online judgment condition, the order of the tasks did
affect the correlation between memory and rating. When the memory task came
before the rating, there was a correlation between memory and rating. However, if
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the memory task came after the rating, there was no correlation between memory and
rating. The reason that the order was important was because if the memory task came
first, it was able to affect the judgment.
The manipulation used in the current study is similar to the memory-rating
order manipulation in Woehr and Feldman (1993). In the current study individuals
will watch video segments and rate performance of the individuals in the segments.
In the explicit condition individuals will write out their reasons for a judgment before
making the judgment. This condition is similar to the condition in Woehr and
Feldman (1993) in which individuals first tried to recall behaviors and then made
judgments. In the implicit condition of the current study, individuals will not write
out reasons before making judgments. This condition is similar to the condition in
Woehr and Feldman (1993) in which individuals made ratings before recalling
behaviors. In the current study, the hypothesis is that there will be a difference
between the implicit and explicit conditions. Woehr and Feldman (1993) found a
difference between the rating first and memory first conditions in their study, but only
when an online judgment was made. Because of the similarity between the
conditions in the current study and the conditions in Woehr and Feldman (1993), it is
likely that a difference will be found between the implicit and explicit conditions only
if individuals are making online judgments. Therefore, in the current study,
individuals will be led to make online rather than memory based judgments. This
will be accomplished by telling individuals, before they begin watching the video
segments, that they will be rating the performance of the individuals in the videos.
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Confidence
Under certain conditions, when individuals focus on reasons for a judgment
before providing the judgment, the judgment decreases in accuracy (McMackin &
Slovic, 2000; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). One possible mechanism for this decrease
in accuracy involves confidence. Individuals may doubt themselves after thinking
about their reasons for making a judgment (Hammond et. al., 1987; Hogarth, 2001,
Tordesillas & Chaiken, 1999). This decrease in confidence may lead them to change
their judgment, even though the judgment may have been initially correct. This
decrease in confidence is especially likely because research (Hammond et. al., 1987;
Hogarth, 2001, Tordesillas & Chaiken, 1999) has indicated that individuals often
have more confidence in implicit reasoning than explicit reasoning.
Tordesillas & Chaiken (1999) investigated confidence using the justification
procedure similar to McMackin and Slovic (2000). The manipulation had individuals
rate the importance of multiple factors that went into their ratings. This manipulation
was supposed to make reasoning explicit. The results indicated that those who rated
multiple factors were less confident than those who did not. This is consistent with
the claim made by Hammond et al. (1987) that those who use an explicit method are
less confident than those who use an implicit method.
Preferences in performance appraisal ratings
When rating an individuals’ performance, raters are often required to provide
both ratings and justification for ratings. If the order of these two processes is
important, a related question is which order raters prefer. A search of the
performance appraisal literature did not yield any research addressing whether
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individuals prefer providing ratings before justification or justification before ratings.
However, studies that address similar questions (Kelley, 2006; Arkes, 2003) suggest
that individuals may prefer making ratings first.
Kelley (2006) studied the response rate of surveys using different types of
rating scales. Two different surveys were mailed. Each had the same number of
items. One group received a survey that had a single holistic Likert rating scale next
to each item. The Likert scale measured the relevance of each behavior queried in the
survey. A second group received a scale that disaggregated the rating into frequency
and importance items. The frequency and importance items were placed next to one
another on each page, so that the actual number of items did not change in the two
conditions. The results indicated that people who were mailed the holistic measure
had higher response rates than people who were mailed the disaggregated measure.
This lower response rate may have occurred because there were twice as many ratings
to be made. However, it is also possible that individuals simply have an aversion to
making disaggregated ratings.
Arkes (2003) described suggestions that he made to the National Science
Foundation and the National Institute of Health. One of the suggestions made to both
agencies was to disaggregate their ratings of grant proposals. The grants had been
rated in a holistic manner, with each grant receiving a single rating of quality. Arkes
suggested that they rate each proposal on four separate criteria, and then average the
ratings. He noted that research supported the idea that the averaged ratings would be
more valid and reliable than the holistic ratings. However, the disaggregation was not
accepted by either organization. The officials at the organizations stated that they
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preferred to evaluate with their “gut.” They preferred to make a holistic, single
rating, rather than carefully breaking down their judgment into various parts. The
officials also stated that they did not want to adhere to specific criteria. These data
indicate that people prefer to make holistic, intuitive evaluations, rather than ratings
based on a number of explicit factors.
Hypotheses
The goal of this study is to investigate explicit and implicit performance
appraisal judgments. Researchers have suggested that explicit processes are more
accurate than implicit processes when a judgment can be decomposed and rules can
be easily discovered (see Hogarth, 2005). A judgment that is based on specific
criteria may be more formulaic than a judgment of overall performance. Therefore
explicit judgments may be more accurate than implicit judgments when rating a
specific behavior.
Hypothesis 1:
When rating a specific aspect of performance, participants will be more accurate
when making explicit judgments than implicit judgments. When rating overall
performance, participants will be more accurate when making implicit judgments
than explicit judgments.
Researchers have also suggested that implicit processes, relative to explicit
processes, increase in accuracy as information increases (Hogarth, 2005).
Hypothesis 2:
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Under low cognitive load, participants will be more accurate when making explicit
judgments than implicit judgments. Under high cognitive load, participants will be
more accurate when making implicit judgments than explicit judgments.
Tordesillas & Chaiken (1999) and Hammond et. al. (1987) have indicated that
individuals have more confidence in their implicit judgments than their explicit
judgments.
Hypothesis 3:
Participants in the implicit condition will be more confident in their ratings than
participants in the explicit condition.
Based on the Arkes (2003) and Masicampo and Baumeister (2008),
individuals should prefer to make simple, holistic judgments over complex, analytical
judgments.
Hypothesis 4:
When choosing between making a rating first or providing reasons for the rating first,
participants will prefer to provide the rating first.
Method
Overview
Participants watched video segments of a male or female food server working
at a restaurant. In the high cognitive load condition they watched 18 video segments,
and in the low cognitive load condition they watched 6 segments. Participants were
then asked to make ratings of the performance of the food server. In the explicit
condition, participants were first asked to type out their reasons for making the rating
before making the rating. In the implicit condition, participants were not asked to
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type out their reasons. In the overall condition, participants rated the overall
performance of the server, and in the specific condition, participants rated the specific
behaviors of memory and cooperation. Participants then answered questions to assess
how well they remembered behaviors displayed in the video segments.
Participants
Data were collected from 316 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory
psychology classes. Participants received course credit for their participation. The
sample included 203 women and 113 men. A total of 74 participants had worked as
food server and 242 had not.
Design
This experiment was a 2 x 2 x 2 completely crossed between-subjects design.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. The factors were
justification type (explicit, implicit), cognitive load (low, high) and rating type
(overall, specific).
Materials
All data in the study were collected with Media Lab version 2006. Media Lab
is a software tool designed to present stimuli and measure responses in behavioral
science studies. The materials used in this study were a series of video segments.
They presented a male or female server working at a restaurant. A sample script is
displayed in Appendix A. The video segments were originally developed by BarnesFarrell (1984). Lewis (2006) recreated these tapes in order to make them appear
more contemporary. Half of the videos portrayed a female food server named Karen,
and half portrayed a male food server named Mike. There are two versions of each
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video, one with Mike and one with Karen. Except for the different food servers, the
two versions of each video are the same.
In the high cognitive load condition there were 12 target video segments and
6 distracter video segments. In the low cognitive load condition there were 4 target
video segments and 2 distracter video segments. Participants in the high load
condition rated 12 target video segments in the first part of the study, and 6 distracter
segments at the end of the study. Participants in the low load condition rated 4 target
video segments in the first part of the study, and 2 distracter segments at the end of
the study. Table 2 and Table 3 display the behaviors featured in the videos segments:
memory, dinner bill activities, maintaining performance levels, and cooperation. The
video segments were played one after another with no pauses between segments. For
half of the participants the target video segments included the male server and
distracter segments included the female server. For the other half of participants
target video segments included the female server and distracter segments included the
male server. The segments were arranged randomly for each participant.
Expert scores
As suggested by Murphy, Garcia, Kerkar, Martin, and Balzer (1982) and
Borman (1978), accuracy of performance appraisal ratings was defined as the
difference between participants’ ratings and “expert scores.” The procedure for
obtaining expert scores was based on the method used by Borman (1978). Four (two
men and two women) Ph.D. candidates in Industrial and Organizational Psychology
each rated 18 videos. All of these subject matter experts had worked as food servers.
The experts watched the videos on computer monitors. Each video was rated
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individually, with one rating for each video. Because the videos of the male and
female server were identical, experts rated only the videos of the female. Experts
were informed of potential rating errors, including halo, leniency, and contrast
effects. They were each given a piece of paper that explained the criteria for each of
the six performance dimensions (see Appendix B).
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used as a measure of
reliability for the expert ratings. According to LeBreton and Senter (2008), one
specific type of ICC, the ICC(A, K), is appropriate when ascertaining the extent to
which a mean rating assigned by multiple judges is reliable. In the current study we
are interested in the reliability of the mean rating provided by the expert judges. The
value of the ICC(18, 4) was .89. This measure is greater than .80, indicating high
reliability (LeBreton & Senter, 2008).
Procedure
An overview of the procedure is presented in Table 4. The study was
conducted in a computer laboratory. Participants were run in groups ranging from 9
to 18. When participants arrived at the study an experiment information sheet was
provided. Participants were informed that participation was voluntary and that they
may withdraw at any time. The script in Appendix C was read aloud to the group of
participants. Participants were informed that they would be asked to rate the
performance of restaurant servers after watching video segments.
After viewing the video segments, participants made ratings of performance
on a 7-point Likert scale. Participants rated the server featured in the target video
segments. Table 5 displays the instructions given as a function of condition (see also
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Appendix D). In the explicit condition, participants first typed out their reasons for
making ratings before making the performance ratings, whereas in the implicit
condition they did not type out ratings. In the overall condition, participants rated
overall performance, whereas in the specific condition, they rated the server’s
cooperation and memory performance. After each performance rating, participants
were asked to rate how confident they were about their performance rating on a 7point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (completely confident).
Participants then performed the memory recognition task (Kinicki, Hom,
Trost, & Wade, 1995; Lewis, 2006; Lord, 1985). Participants were asked to respond
“yes” or “no” to 12 questions asking whether or not certain behaviors occurred. The
memory recognition questions are displayed in Tables 2 and 3, and a sample is
provided in Appendix E. Half of the correct answers were “yes” and half were “no.”
The questions in the high load and low load conditions were different because the
videos in the two conditions were different.
After performing the memory recognition task, participants performed the
final rating (see Appendix F). The purpose of the final performance rating was to
determine whether participants preferred to give ratings first or to give reasons for
ratings first. Participants were given one of two sets of instructions to counterbalance
the order in which the tasks were mentioned. The instructions were: “We want you to
give both performance ratings and reasons for the ratings that you give. Please click
one of the buttons below” or “We want you to give both reasons for the ratings that
you give and performance ratings. Please click one of the buttons below.” The
screen displayed two buttons that displayed the text “Rating” and “Reasons For
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Rating” horizontally. The order was counterbalanced so that in half the cases the
“Rating” button was on the left and in half the cases it was on the right.
Participants then filled out the decision making inventory (DMI) (Nygren &
White, 2002). The DMI was included as an exploratory measure. The DMI measures
the extent to which individuals prefer to use analytical and intuitive reasoning.
Finally, participants were asked to provide their gender and whether they ever worked
as a food server.
Results
Dependent measure computation
Table 6 displays an overview of computation of the dependent measures. The
primary dependent measure was accuracy of performance rating. Accuracy was
computed by taking the ratings of participants and subtracting them from the ratings
of experts and then taking the absolute value of those scores (as did Borman, 1978,
and McMakin & Slovic, 2000). These accuracy scores represent deviation from the
expert scores. Because the scores represent deviation from the expert ratings, higher
scores represent less accuracy.
Recognition accuracy was computed using the Ad′ measure, a signal detection
statistic (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Ad′ represents participants’ ability to
distinguish correct and incorrect answers. As suggested by Stanislaw and Todorov
(1999, p. 144), hit rate and false alarm rates of 0.0 were replaced with 0.5/n and hit
rate and false alarm rates of 1.0 were replaced with (n - .05)/n.
Table 7 displays the mean performance ratings and true (expert) scores for
each condition. The performance ratings are participants’ ratings of the target videos.
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The expert scores displayed in the table are the average of the expert ratings of the
target videos. To ensure that expert scores matched the expected level of
performance, the average expert score was also computed for low, medium and high
performance. The average expert scores were 1.89 for low performance, 4.23 for
medium performance, and 7.00 for high performance.
Effects of the justification manipulation on ratings
Table 8 displays mean performance ratings as a function of justification type.
To test for the effect of justification for each rating, t-tests were computed separately
for the memory, cooperation, and overall ratings. For the memory rating, there was a
significant effect for justification, t(159) = 2.33, p < .05. Participants in the explicit
condition gave higher ratings than participants in the implicit condition. For the
cooperation rating, there was no significant effect for justification, t(159) = 2.33, p >
.05, and for the overall rating, there was no significant effect for justification, t(153) =
1.16, p > .05. Only one of the three tests was significant, and the mean effect size for
the three mean differences was 0.29. Overall, the justification factor had small effects
on performance rating values.
Another way to test the effect of justification is to count the number of words
typed. If typing words reflects explicit reasoning, then participants who typed more
words may have been using more explicit reasoning than participants who typed
fewer words. The correlations between number of words and memory (r(158) = .10), cooperation (r(158) = .07), and overall (r(158) = .09) ratings were not
significant, all ps > .05. The number of words that participants wrote did not affect
the performance ratings.
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Rating accuracy
Table 9 displays scores for rating accuracy and recognition accuracy. Rating
accuracy scores represent a combination of overall, memory, and cooperation
accuracy ratings (see Table 6 for exact computational details). An ANOVA was
performed on rating accuracy. The independent variables for the ANOVA included
the three manipulated factors (justification, cognitive load, and rating type) and all
two-way interactions between these factors. Participant sex, sex of the server
featured in the videos (server sex), and experience as a server were included as
control variables. The results of the ANOVA are displayed in Table 10. The
ANOVA revealed a main effect for participant sex, F(1, 306) = 10.71, p < .05.
Women (M = 1.02, SD = 0.67) were significantly more accurate than men (M = 1.22,
SD = 0.76). There was also a main effect for cognitive load, F(1, 306) = 11.51, p <
.05, with high load participants (M = 0.97, SD = 0.70) being more accurate than low
load participants (M = 1.23, SD = 0.69). This main effect is difficult to interpret
because the videos in the two conditions were different, therefore the level of
difficulty may have been different in the two conditions. There was a significant
interaction between cognitive load and rating type, F(1, 306) = 14.96, p < .05 (see
mean values in Table 11). T-tests revealed that in the low cognitive load condition,
participants rating overall performance were more accurate than those rating specific
performance, t(150) = 3.14, p < .01. In the high cognitive load condition, there was
no difference between the overall and specific ratings, t(162) = 1.59, p > .05, although
there was a trend toward specific ratings being more accurate than overall ratings.
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Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be an interaction between the
justification manipulation and the rating type manipulation. Contrary to Hypothesis
1, the interaction between justification and rating type was not significant, F(1, 306) =
0.74, p > .05. This result indicated that the effect of the justification manipulation on
rating accuracy did not differ in the specific and overall conditions. Hypothesis 2
stated that there would be an interaction between justification and cognitive load on
rating accuracy. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the interaction between justification and
cognitive load was not significant, F(1, 306) = 0.56, p > .05. This result indicated
that the effect of the justification manipulation on rating accuracy did not differ in the
high and low cognitive load conditions. The main effect for justification was also not
significant, F(1, 306) = 1.45, p > .05. The correlation between number of words
typed in the explicit condition and rating accuracy was not significant, r(158) = .08, p
> .05.
Recognition accuracy
Table 9 displays scores for recognition accuracy. An ANOVA was performed
on recognition accuracy. The independent variables for the ANOVA included the
three manipulated factors (justification, cognitive load, and rating type) and all twoway interactions between these factors. Participant sex, sex of the server featured in
the videos (server sex), and experience as a server were included as control variables.
The results of the ANOVA are displayed in Table 12. There were main effects for
both participant sex, F(1, 306) = 4.84, p < .05, and server sex, F(1, 306) = 7.70, p <
.05 (see Table 13). The main effect for participant sex is further evidence that women
were more accurate in the current study. The interaction term between participant sex
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and server sex was added to the ANOVA, but was not significant, F(1, 305) = 2.27, p
> .05. There was a main effect for cognitive load, F(1, 306) = 96.57, p < .05, with
low load participants (M = .81, SD = 0.12) being more accurate than high load
participants (M = .66, SD = 0.14).
Hypothesis 2 stated that there would be an interaction between the
justification factor and the cognitive load factor. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the
interaction between justification and cognitive load was not significant, F(1, 306) =
0.04, p > .05. This result indicated that the effect of the justification manipulation on
recognition did not differ in the high and low cognitive load conditions. The main
effect for justification was also not significant, F(1, 306) = 0.04, p > .05. The
correlation between number of words typed in the explicit condition and recognition
accuracy was not significant, r(158) = .01, p > .05.
Confidence
The mean confidence ratings are displayed in Table 14. The two confidence
values in the specific condition (confidence in memory ratings and confidence in
cooperation ratings) were combined using the arithmetic mean. An ANOVA was
performed on the averaged confidence values (see Table 15). The independent
variables for the ANOVA included the three manipulated factors (justification,
cognitive load, and rating type) and all two-way interactions between these factors.
Participant sex, sex of the server featured in the videos (server sex), and experience as
a server were included as control variables. Hypothesis 3 claimed that participants in
the implicit condition would be more confident in their ratings than participants in the
explicit condition. The main effect for justification was not significant, F(1, 306) =
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1.14, p > .05. These results do not confirm Hypothesis 3. There was a significant
main effect for rating type, F(1, 306) = 5.63, p < .05. Participants in the specific
condition (M = 6.00, SD = 0.78) were more confident than participants in the overall
condition (M = 5.75, SD = 1.02).
Final rating
Hypothesis 5 claims that when faced with a choice of making a rating first or
providing reasons for a rating first, participants will prefer to provide the rating first.
A chi square test, χ2(1) = 71.2, p < .05, revealed that more participants chose to
provide the rating first (74%) than chose to provide reasons first (26%). Even in the
explicit condition, in which participants had been writing their reasons first
throughout the experiment, participants chose to provide their rating first 64% of the
time, which is significantly greater than those who chose to provide reasons first
(36%), χ2(1) = 17.1, p < .05.
When clicking buttons on the screen during the final rating, participants chose
the button on the left 72% of the time, which is significantly greater than those who
chose the button on the right (28%), χ2(1) = 58.5, p < .05. When the “rating” button
was on the left, participants chose that button 97% of the time, which is significantly
greater than those who chose the button on the right (3%), χ2(1) = 133.6, p < .05. As
a whole, these results are overwhelming evidence that individuals generally tend to
choose a button on the left over a button on the right, and that people choose to
provide a rating before providing reasons for the rating.
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Decision Making Inventory
There were no significant correlations between the DMI and any performance
or accuracy ratings (all ps > .05).
Discussion
The primary hypotheses in the current study were not supported. Participants
who wrote out reasons before making judgments were not more accurate or confident
than participants who did not write out reasons. There were no differences between
those who did and did not write out reasons on performance rating accuracy, memory
recognition accuracy, and confidence in performance ratings. Overall, the effect of
writing out reasons was weak.
The effect of the justification manipulation was not only small when making
performance ratings, but also when attempting to recall behaviors. The difference on
the memory recognition task between those who did and did not type out reasons was
nearly zero. One may have suspected that, at the very least, typing out reasons for a
judgment would have primed participants’ memory for the incidents in the video
segments, and recognition accuracy would be higher than those who did not type out
ratings. This did not occur, and is evidence of the weak effects of typing out reasons
for a judgment. Although prior research has shown that individuals have more
confidence in implicit reasoning than explicit reasoning (Hammond et. al., 1987;
Hogarth, 2001, Tordesillas & Chaiken, 1999), in the current study there were no
differences in confidence between the explicit and implicit conditions. This result is
further evidence that writing out reasons has a weak effect on performance appraisal
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judgments. It is quite surprising that carefully reflecting on a judgment has such
minor effects on judgment, memory recognition, and confidence.
There are several possible explanations for why the effect of the justification
manipulation was weak. Whenever a manipulation does not result in a difference
between conditions, a natural question to ask is whether the manipulation was strong
enough to elicit an effect. The manipulation used in the current study was very
strong. It is difficult to imagine a more powerful way of making something explicit
than having participants type out their reasons for making a particular rating.
Compared to asking participants to think about their reasons and/or to speak their
reasons out loud, typing reasons requires them to put their reasoning onto the screen,
so they can actually see their reasons clearly. A more likely explanation for the small
differences between the explicit and implicit condition involves when judgments were
made. Participants were told twice, for emphasis, that they would be watching videos
and rating performance of restaurant servers. Based on Hastie and Park (1986), this
should have led them to make “online” judgments. These are judgments that are
made while participants are watching the video segments. When participants were
then asked to type out reasons for their judgments, the judgments had already been
made implicitly. In this sense, they are not really writing out the reasons for their
judgments before the judgments are made, because the judgments had already been
made. If this is the case, then typing out reasons may not be helpful or harmful
because the judgments have already been made, and it is too late for the additional
reasoning to change the judgments.
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However, there are reasons to believe that some of the judgments made in the
current study were memory based, rather than online, judgments. Memory based
judgments are unexpected, which forces individuals to rely on memory to make a
judgment (Hastie and Park, 1986). In the specific condition, participants did not
know that they would be asked to make ratings specifically about the server’s
cooperation and memory. When they were asked to make ratings of cooperation and
memory, they had to rely on memory to make the judgments. Because there were no
significant differences between the explicit and implicit conditions for the specific
ratings, it is less likely that the explanation for these small differences is that
participants made an online judgment. Woehr and Feldman (1993) found that when
individuals made memory based judgments, it did not matter whether they recalled
behaviors first or made ratings first, just as in the current study it did not matter
whether participants wrote out reasons before making ratings. If participants in the
current study made memory based judgments, then when participants were asked to
make a performance appraisal rating, they would have consciously considered
reasons why they should give a particular rating, even if they were not asked to type
out their judgments. If this is the case, then participants in the explicit and implicit
conditions were using similar cognitive processes when making ratings. In both
conditions, participants explicitly thought about reasons for making ratings. If
participants used similar processes in both conditions, then they should have had
similar performance ratings, confidence ratings, and memory recognition, as was
found in the current study.
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Based upon criteria specified in cognitive continuum theory (Hammond,
1996), McMackin and Slovic (2000) assumed that when individuals performed tasks
that induce implicit or explicit reasoning, individuals would be more accurate if they
utilized a matching mode of cognition. McMackin and Slovic (2000) assumed that
rating advertisements would induce implicit reasoning, and they found that
individuals were indeed more accurate when using implicit reasoning rather than
explicit reasoning. On the other hand, estimating numerical quantities (e.g., area of
the U.S. in square miles) should have induced explicit reasoning. Results confirmed
their prediction; individuals were more accurate when using explicit reasoning than
they were if they used implicit reasoning. Results of the present study do not support
those of McMakin and Slovic (2000). Perhaps it is not always true that tasks
inducing implicit reasoning are performed most accurately when using implicit
reasoning. For example, although tasks with larger number of attributes (greater than
5) are expected to induce implicit reasoning (Hammond et al, 1987), it is questionable
that such tasks will be more accurate when using implicit reasoning than when using
explicit reasoning if the compound nature (pattern) of the stimulus attributes does not
induce reappraisal. In the current study it is possible that although the performance
appraisal task induced implicit reasoning, it was not more accurate when implicit
reasoning was used.
Wilson and Schooler (1991) suggest another possible reason for the weak
effect of the justification manipulation. They state that individuals are often unaware
of why they have certain beliefs. Therefore, when individuals think about the reasons
for the beliefs, the reasons they consider may not be the actual reasons. Because
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these reasons are different than their actual reasons, beliefs are changed to reflect the
written reasons. If this suggestion is correct, then the weakness of the justification
manipulation in the current study may have occurred because people were aware of
the reasons for their beliefs. The videos contained clear examples of negative and
positive behaviors, such as showing up late for work, bringing people the wrong
orders, remembering everyone’s orders, and cooperating with coworkers. Focusing
on reasons did not change individuals’ ratings because the true reasons for their
ratings matched their written reasons. Wilson and Schooler (1991) also state that if
the reasons that individuals consider are the same valence as the actual reasons for the
belief, focusing on reasons will not change a belief. In the current study, if
individuals formed a positive (or negative) attitude toward the server, and then wrote
out positive (or negative) reasons, writing out the reasons would not change the initial
attitude/opinion.
Wilson, Kraft, and Dunn (1989) found that when individuals were
knowledgeable about an attitude object, there was no attitude change after thinking
about the attitude object. Participants in the current study should have been
knowledgeable of the job of food server. They are likely to have eaten at restaurants
numerous times throughout their lives, and 31% of them had worked as food servers.
This familiarity with the subject matter may explain the lack of differences between
the explicit and implicit groups. If an unfamiliar job were used instead, maybe there
would be differences between the explicit and implicit conditions.
Results from the current study were not consistent with those of earlier studies
investigating explicit processes in performance appraisal (DeNisi et al., 1989; Varma
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et al., 1996). DeNisi et al. (1989) found that keeping a diary while watching videos
of carpenters performing their work led to more accurate appraisal of their
performance. Participants in the DeNisi et al. (1989) study were told to write down
the tasks performed and how well they were performed while watching the
performances. Therefore, they were taking notes while watching the videos of
performance. In the current study participants wrote down reasons after watching the
videos of performance. This lack of convergence between the current study and
DeNisi et al. (1989) may be due to the fact that in the DeNisi study, individuals could
use their diaries to organize information in a meaningful way as they were watching
the video segments. In the current study, participants’ written accounts were based
on memory, which is fallible.
Gender differences
Results indicated that women were more accurate than men on the memory
and rating tasks. There are several possible explanations for this effect. It is possible
that women are simply more accurate in social judgment. Women are more accurate
in decoding non-verbal emotions (Hall, Carter, & Horgan, 2000). Carter and Hall
(2008) found the women were more accurate in detecting covariation between group
membership and behaviors exhibited by group members, a sign of accurate social
perception. Another possibility is that women put more effort into the study. Hyde
(2001) reviewed seven studies investigating gender differences in conscientiousness,
and indicated that women may be slightly higher in conscientiousness. Four studies
indicated women were higher in conscientiousness, two studies indicated that men
were higher, and one study found no difference.
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Confidence
Prior research has indicated that individuals have more confidence in implicit
reasoning than explicit reasoning (Hammond et. al., 1987; Hogarth, 2001, Tordesillas
& Chaiken, 1999). In the current study there was no difference in confidence
between participants in the explicit and implicit conditions. This suggests that
participants in the explicit and implicit conditions may have been using similar
cognitive processing.
Results from the current study indicated that participants who made specific
ratings were more confident in their ratings than those who made overall ratings.
Participants in the specific condition may have been more confident because the
precise, detailed directions that were provided in the specific condition may have led
participants to believe that they knew what was required of them.
Final rating
The most robust findings in the current study involve the final rating.
Participants chose to perform the rating task before providing reasons 74% of the
time. Perhaps participants chose to make the rating first because they prefer to make
holistic, simple ratings rather than having to first think in detail about the rating
(Arkes, 2003; Kelley, 2006; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). This preference has a
number of possible implications. Individuals may prefer to make holistic ratings in
many situations.
Participants chose the button on the left 72% of the time. This may not be
surprising given that many things in western culture are ordered from left to right.
Santiago, Lupiáñez, Pérez, and Funes, (2007) list things that are ordered from left to
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right in Western cultures. These include text, horizontal graphs of time, comic strips,
and book pages. Chokron and Agostini (2000) compared the esthetic preferences of
French and Israeli participants. French participants read from left to right, but Israeli
participants read from right to left. Results indicated that left to right readers
preferred pictures facing the right, and right to left readers preferred pictures facing
the left. When faced with two buttons on a screen, it appears that the left button is
usually the first one that is examined. The current study indicates that the default, or
most common, option should be associated with the button on the left.
Conclusion
Based on Wilson and Schooler (1991) and McMackin and Slovic (2000), there
should have been differences between the explicit and implicit conditions in the
current study. However, these differences did not emerge. The task used in the
current study was a performance appraisal rating. This task was different from the
tasks used by Wilson and Schooler (1991) and McMackin and Slovic (2000). Further
research is needed to determine what characteristics of the current task led to the
discrepancy between the current results and the results found in previous research.
Participants either provided justification before making a performance
appraisal rating, or simply made the rating. This manipulation was meant to represent
real world performance appraisal, in which supervisors provide both a rating and
justification for their rating. The results provided evidence that the order of tasks,
providing justification first or making ratings first, did not affect performance
appraisal ratings strongly. As a practical matter, this may be comforting information,
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given that there does not appear to be a common industry standard recommending a
particular sequence of ratings and justifications.
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Table 1
Correlations between memory positivity and rating positivity

Judgment type
Online judgment
Memory-based judgment

Memory First

Rating First

0.46*
0.49*

0.10
0.40*

Note. From Woehr and Feldman (1993). A * indicates a significant correlation, p < .05.
The correlations in the online judgment condition are significantly different from one another.
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Table 2
Memory recognition questions in the high cognitive load condition

Performance
dimension

Performance
level

Memory question

Did the
behavior
occur?

Memory
Low
Low

Medium

Karen presented the wrong order to a man and
woman and did not apologize for her mistake.
Two men were sitting at a table and Karen gave one
man the other man's French fries.
Four men ordered four drinks and Karen asked each
person who had which drink and the last drink served
was a beer.

No
Yes

Yes

Dinner bill
activities

Low

Medium
Medium

Four men were looking at the bill and one of them
stated that the bill was wrong because he had not
ordered dessert.
Karen brought separate checks to each of three
women and asked the first two what they had eaten
and then handed the last check to the last woman
without asking her what she had eaten.
A coworker noticed that Karen made one mistake on
the bill but said that she is always very accurate.

Yes

Yes
No

Maintaining
performance
levels
Low
Medium
Medium

Karen called a coworker by her correct name at first
but later called her by the wrong name.
A coworker stated that Karen was sweating because
she couldn't handle the pressure.
Two women stated that Karen was frustrated and
when she came by she apologized and stated that
she was just a little busy that night.

Yes
No
No

Cooperation

Medium
Medium

High

Karen offered to help a coworker by telling her to put
the full glasses in the middle of the tray.
A coworker asked Karen to help her and Karen moved
some chairs and a table for her.
After a male coworker said that there were business
men drinking like fish, Karen volunteered to clean his
table.

No
No

Yes
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Table 3
Memory recognition questions in the low cognitive load condition

Performance
dimension

Performance
level

Memory question

Did the
behavior
occur?

Memory

Low

Karen presented the wrong order to a man and
woman and did not apologize for her mistake.
Karen brought the wrong food and the man said that
he ordered the angus steak.
Karen brought the wrong food and when she was
notified of the mistake she said she would go fix it for
them.

Medium

A coworker noticed that Karen made one mistake on
the bill but said that she is always very accurate.

Low
Low

No
No
Yes

Dinner bill
activities

Medium
Medium

Karen accidentally typed in a discount for carrot cake.
After a coworker told Karen she made an error, Karen
said that she did and thanked the coworker.

Low

Karen called a coworker by her correct name at first
but later called her by the wrong name.

No

Yes
Yes

Maintaining
performance
levels

Low
Low

Karen accidentally grabbed tea instead of coffee.
Karen accidentally called a woman Laurie by the
name Linda.

Yes
No
No

Cooperation

High
High
High

After a male coworker said that there were business
men drinking like fish, Karen volunteered to clean his
table.
Karen said that she would clean off his table because
she only has a few tables to watch.
The man said he had a table of nine and that they
were drinking like fish.

Yes
No
Yes
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Table 4
Procedure
1. Watch 18 videos (high cognitive load condition) or watch 6 videos (low cognitive load condition)
2. Type reasons for performance rating (explicit condition) or do not type reasons (implicit
condition)
3. Rate overall performance (overall condition) or rate cooperation and memory (implicit condition)

1

4. Rate confidence in the performance rating
5. Answer memory recognition questions
6. Choose order for final rating: Rate performance then type reasons for the rating or type reasons
for the rating then rate performance
7. Make final performance rating
8. Fill out decision making Inventory
1

Note. The memory and cooperation ratings are counterbalanced so that for half of the participants
memory is rated first and for half cooperation is rated first.
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Table 5
Instructions as a function of condition
Explicit overall
instructions

Explicit specific
instructions

Screen 1

Overall
Instructions +
Explicit
Instructions

Memory Instructions
+ Explicit
Instructions

Screen 2

"Please give a
rating of Karen's
overall
performance."

"Please give a
rating of the Karen's
performance on
memory."

Screen 3

Cooperation
Instructions +
Explicit Instructions

Screen 4

"Please give a
rating of Karen's
performance on
cooperation."

Note.
Explicit
Instructions:

Overall
Instructions:
Memory
Instructions:
Cooperation
Instructions:

Implicit overall
instructions
Overall
Instructions +
"Please give a
rating of Karen's
overall
performance."

Implicit specific
instructions
Memory Instructions
+ "Please give a
rating of the Karen's
performance on
memory."
Cooperation
Instructions +
"Please give a rating
of Karen's
performance on
cooperation."

On the next screen you will be asked to give a rating of Karen’s (Mike’s)
performance. Before making your rating, we want you to think analytically about the
reasons for your rating. Put your emotions aside and type, in the space below, the
reasons you think are important in providing your rating.
We are interested in Karen's (Mike’s) overall performance. How well did Karen
perform all of her duties?
We are interested in Karen's (Mike’s) performance with respect to memory. How
well did Karen remember orders, bring the correct orders to the guests, and
remember the correct beverages and side orders?
We are interested in Karen's (Mike’s) performance with respect to cooperation. How
well did Karen accept guidance from supervisors and coworkers, and cooperate with
and help other servers, supervisors, and wait staff?
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Table 6
Dependent measures summary
Measure

Description

Formula

Overall rating
accuracy

Subtract the participant's overall rating from
the mean overall expert rating. Take the
absolute value.

abs(participant's overall rating mean expert overall rating )

Memory rating
accuracy

Subtract the participant's memory rating
from the mean memory expert rating. Take
the absolute value.

abs(participant's cooperation
rating - mean expert cooperation
rating)

Cooperation
rating accuracy

Subtract the participant's cooperation rating
from the mean cooperation expert rating.
Take the absolute value. .

abs(participant's memory rating mean expert memory rating)

Specific rating
accuracy

Rating accuracy

Recognition
accuracy

Take the mean of the cooperation accuracy
rating and the recognition accuracy rating.
In the overall condition, rating accuracy is
equal to the overall rating accuracy. In the
specific condition, rating accuracy is equal
to the specific rating accuracy (the average
of the cooperation and memory rating
accuracy).
Ability to distinguish signal from noise.
Approximately equal to the percentage of
memory questions answered correctly.

Note. abs = absolute value.

Table 7

mean(accuracy of memory rating,
accuracy of overall rating)
If in overall condition: overall
rating accuracy. If in specific
condition: specific rating accuracy
NORMDIST((NORMSINV(Hit
rate) - NORMSINV(False alarm
rate))/SQRT(2))
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Mean performance appraisal rating as a function of condition
Low Load
Rating

Justification

Cooperation

Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Explicit

Memory
Overall

High Load

N

Mean

SD

True
Score

N

Mean

SD

True
Score

39
39
39
39
33
41

5.64
5.33
2.26
2.67
3.36
3.61

1.14
1.22
0.97
0.90
1.27
1.20

7.00
7.00
1.25
1.25
3.63
3.63

42
41
42
41
44
37

6.02
5.78
2.67
3.10
4.32
4.76

0.98
1.17
1.30
1.26
1.27
1.06

6.00
6.00
3.08
3.08
3.90
3.90
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Table 8
Mean Performance Ratings
Rating
Judgment
Cooperation
Memory
Overall

Note. * p < .05

Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Explicit

N

Mean

SD

Mean Difference
(Implicit vs. Explicit)

81
80
81
80
77
78

5.84
5.56

1.07
1.21
1.16
1.11
1.35
1.27

0.28

2.47
2.89
3.91
4.15

0.42*
-0.24
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Table 9
Mean rating accuracy and recognition accuracy scores
Low Load
Rating

Justification

N

Rating
Accuracy

SD

Specific

Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Explicit

39
39
33
41

1.23
1.57
1.07
1.04

0.64
0.74
0.71
0.58

Overall

Recognition
Accuracy
0.82
0.82
0.80
0.81

High Load
SD

N

Rating
Accuracy

SD

0.13
0.12
0.15
0.10

42
41
44
37

0.92
0.85
1.01
1.11

0.53
0.56
0.86
0.79

Recognition
Accuracy
0.66
0.68
0.66
0.65

Note. Rating accuracy represents deviation from the expert score: Higher scores indicate less
accuracy. Recognition accuracy is based on the Ad′ statistic: Higher scores indicate greater
accuracy.

SD

0.15
0.13
0.15
0.15
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Table 10
Analysis of Variance for Performance Rating Accuracy
df
Source

F

p

Experience as a server

1

0.00

0.96

Server Sex
Participant Sex

1
1

0.00
10.71

0.95
0.00*

Justification
Cognitive Load
Rating Type
Justification * Cognitive Load

1
1
1
1

1.45
11.51
1.99
0.56

0.23
0.00*
0.16
0.45

Justification * Rating Type
Rating Type * Cognitive Load
Error

1
1
306

0.74
14.96
(0.46)

0.39
0.00*

Note. Value enclosed in parenthesis represents mean square error.
* p < .05

57

Table 11
Mean Performance Accuracy Ratings as a Function of Cognitive Load
and Rating Type
Cognitive Load
Rating Type
N
Mean
SD
Low

Specific
Overall

78
74

1.40
1.05

0.71
0.64

152

1.23

0.69

83
81

0.88
1.06

0.55
0.83

Specific and Overall

164

0.97

0.70

Specific
Overall

161
155

1.13
1.06

0.68
0.74

Specific and Overall
High

High and Low

Specific
Overall
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Table 12
Analysis of Variance for Recognition accuracy
df
Source

F

p

Experience as a server

1

0.41

0.52

Server Sex
Participant Sex

1
1

7.70
4.84

0.01*
0.03*

Justification
Cognitive Load
Rating Type
Justification * Cognitive Load

1
1
1
1

0.04
96.57
1.16
0.04

0.85
0.00*
0.28
0.84

Justification * Rating Type
Rating Type * Cognitive Load
Error

1
1
306

0.03
0.07
(0.02)

0.87
0.80

Note. Value enclosed in parenthesis represents mean square error.
* p < .05
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Table 13
Mean Ratings as a Function of Sex
Rating Accuracy
Participant
sex
Male

Female

Male and
Female

Server Sex
Male
Female
Both
servers
Male
Female
Both
servers
Male
Server
Female
Server

Recognition
accuracy
Mean
SD

N

Mean

SD

54
59

1.30
1.15

0.77
0.75

0.71
0.71

0.15
0.17

113

1.22

0.76

0.71

0.16

100
103

0.98
1.07

0.60
0.73

0.71
0.79

0.16
0.13

203

1.02

0.67

0.75

0.15

154

1.09

0.68

0.71

0.15

162

1.10

0.74

0.76

0.15
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Table 14
Mean Confidence Ratings
Low Load
Rating

Judgment

Cooperation

Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Explicit
Implicit
Explicit

Memory
Overall

High Load

N

Mean

SD

N

Mean

SD

39
39
39
39
33
41

6.05
5.77
6.08
5.90
5.64
5.85

0.97
1.04
0.90
0.99
1.17
0.79

42
41
42
41
44
37

6.31
6.15
5.88
5.85
5.91
5.54

0.75
0.73
1.21
1.17
1.07
1.04
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Table 15
Analysis of Variance for Confidence in Performance Ratings
df
F
Source

p

Experience as a server

1

0.24

0.62

Server Sex
Participant Sex

1
1

0.80
0.00

0.37
0.99

Justification
Cognitive Load
Rating Type
Justification * Cognitive Load

1
1
1
1

1.14
0.27
5.63
0.82

0.29
0.60
0.02*
0.37

Justification * Rating Type
Rating Type * Cognitive Load
Error

1
1
306

0.12
1.78
(0.83)

0.73
0.18

Note. Value enclosed in parenthesis represents mean square error.
* p < .05
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Appendix A
Sample Performance Appraisal Video Script
LOW PERFORMANCE
Memory- Brings orders to wrong people.
Setting: Two people- one male, one female- waiting to receive main course.
Conversing about friend in MBA program.
G1 (Female): I've heard they serve delicious veal marsala here. I'm really glad I
ordered it.
G2(Male): Yeah, I've heard the Steak Diane is quite good. A buddy of mine was here
last week, and he said it was fantastic!
G1(Fe): Well, I'm starving! I can't wait to get our order.
Waitress approaches table carrying a tray.
G2(Ma): I am hungry too. Ah, here's our waiter...
Waitress places a meal in front of the two individuals.
G1(Fe): Ah super! Miss, I'm sorry, but this isn't what I ordered. I ordered Veal
Marsala.
G2(Ma):(Addressing waitress) This doesn’t look like Steak Diane it looks like
London Broil, or something.
Waitress: (repeats the correct order, apologizes, and leaves to get the Steak Diane and
Veal Marsala) And you had Steak Diane, and you had Veal Marsala, I must have
brought the wrong order. I’m really sorry I will get your correct orders.
Conversation about "Alan" resumes between the man and woman seated at the table.
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Appendix B
Performance dimensions.

Dinner bill:
How well did the server present the bill to the appropriate guest at the appropriate
time, and ensure that the bill had been added correctly and can be read and
understood by the guests?
Maintaining performance levels:
How well did the server maintain patience, composure and good service when under
pressure from crowds, large parties, or when tired?
Memory:
How well did the server remember orders, bring the correct order to the guest, and
remember the correct beverages and side orders?
Cooperation:
How well did the server accept guidance from supervisors and coworkers, and
cooperate with and help other servers, supervisors, and wait staff?
Work Habits:
How consistently did the server wear appropriate clothing and arrive at work on time?
Was the server well groomed, prepared for work, and flexible to accommodate
company needs?
Menu familiarity:
How well did the server display a familiarity with the food prices, ingredients,
quality, portion sizes, and daily specials?
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Appendix C
Opening Instructions
Thank you for coming in today. In this study you are going to be watching some
videos of waiters and waitresses. You are then going to rate their performance.
Please carefully read all of the instructions as you go through the study. This is a nice
short study so you can take your time. Please let me know if you have any questions
at any point. You can now read the instructions on the computer and begin.
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Appendix D
Explicit manipulation screenshot
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Appendix E
Sample memory recognition question screenshot
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Appendix F

Final rating choice

